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Abstract
In this chapter, there has been presented destruction estimation models of construction
elements of aircraft in different cases of the state of readiness. The following cases have
been examined: when a diagnostic parameter indicating the state of readiness exceeds
critical point; when unexpected failure occurs as a result of overload impulse; when a
diagnostic parameter increases and as a result premature failure occurs; when damage
can be indicated with a diagnostic parameter and an unexpected failure may occur.
Differential calculus of Fokker-Planck type has been used in creating the model. Second
part of the chapter includes a method of probability and risk evaluation of technical
damage to functional-relief (redundant) systems using the Poisson model. The chapter
raised the problem of diagnosis errors and erroneous usability evaluation, and describes
the example of a real event of an aircraft landing without the released landing gear as a
consequence of an erroneous diagnostics. The rescue process in a situation of an aviation
accident hazard was described briefly.
Keywords: aircraft, probability, failure, protective systems, diagnostic
1. Introduction
In this chapter, the concept of a hazard in transport systems will be restricted and limited to the
aviation technology. It is also assumed that these threats will be related to the possibility of the
occurrence of catastrophic and signalled damage due to technical reasons caused by destruc-
tive processes, which appear during the aircraft operation. The current aircraft is characterised
by a high level of reliability and durability. The reliability and durability tests of aviation
technology are carried out in two different ways. The first way involves station tests of the
selected units of objects and construction systems under simulated loads and operating condi-
tions, while diagnosing the technical condition and recording data on the course of destruction
processes.
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The second way is to use an external central computerised system of monitoring and analysing
the operation process of the entire set of objects, including a system of recording operational
events and an information processing system. The system of recording information obtained
during diagnostic checks and detected damage divided by types, symptoms, causes and
effects is of particular importance. The recorded data are used for determination of the reliabil-
ity and safety characteristics, and provide the opportunity to estimate a functioning resource.
2. Safety hazard due to sudden and developing damage in transport
systems
Despite many efforts in the processes of designing and implementation of new aircraft construc-
tions, the occurrence of not signalled (sudden) damage, the effects of which are serious, took
place. They may occur in the process of operation for many reasons, and mostly due to the lack
of complete recognition of many processes that take place during the aviation equipment oper-
ation. So far, there has been also a lack of methodology for optimal shaping of construction
elements based on destruction models, which would take into account all possible types of their
loads and assessment of the environmental impact effects in the long-term operation.
For example, it is possible to distinguish some causes of sudden (catastrophic) damage. They
are as follows [1]:
• The loss of the volume strength of the element, which can be damaged as a result of the
occurrence of excessive permanent deformations, the occurrence of an ad hoc crack, or a
fatigue crack, which exceeded the critical value.
• The loss in material properties in the construction elements as a result of functioning of
ageing processes.
• The loss of the element’s usability as a result of the surface wear or the inclusions of
foreign matters between the cooperating elements.
• The random increase in the concentration of vapours of chemicals and the occurrence of
circumstances conductive to uncontrolled explosions.
• The random shortcuts in the electronic circuits.
All the causes leading to catastrophic damage are the subject of numerous experimental and
theoretical considerations.
The occurrence of catastrophic damage to the aircraft equipment usually results in serious
failures or catastrophes and large losses. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the risk of
incurring these losses.
The term of risk is understood as the probability of the occurrence of critical damage or an
adverse event in case of the occurrence of losses. In our case, a negative phenomenon will
include the occurrence of catastrophic damage to aircraft. The level of the accepted risk of
negative events is determined by the frequency of their occurrence and costs. In Figure 1, a
method for determination of the accepted risk range is presented.
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where R(t)—probability of failure to the catastrophic damage occurrence.
E[O]—expected value of the cost of developing the construction and reliability test (in
order to eliminate catastrophic damage).
E[S]—expected value of the risk resulting from the frequency of the failure and losses as a
result of the occurrence of catastrophic damage in the operation process.
E[K]—expected value of the total cost E[K] = E[O] + E[S].
Figure 1 shows the possibility of moving from the zero-risk policy of a threat to the ‘accept-
able’ risk policy based on the principle ‘as low the risk, as it is reasonably achievable’.
The basis for estimating the risk of threat is a forecast of the occurrence of negative phenomena
during operation resulting in catastrophic damage.
In this chapter, the selected models, which can be used for estimating the reliability and risk of
the occurrence of catastrophic damage in the accepted time period of the device operation, will
be presented.
3. Types of damage causing threats and models for assessing the
probability of their occurrence
3.1. Classification of construction systems and wear processes
By assumption, the aviation technology has high reliability requirements, which, in practice,
are implemented through special inspection procedures and appropriate design solutions
involving the introduction of excesses of structure, strength, power, information, etc. The
structural excess is characterised by elements or functional systems, basic and reserve-
protective ones. After damage to the basic system, the protection systems start functioning. It
ensures a high safety level of aircraft flights, which is one of the most important issues in the
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Figure 1. Diagram for determination of the acceptable range of the risk of losses.
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air transport. Despite these protections and great efforts of technical services, the failures that
cause accidents occur.
The protecting systems constituting the reserve of basic systems significantly increase the
production costs and reduce the overall performance, such as capacity, range, fuel consump-
tion, etc. They also require special treatment in the operation of aircraft, so that they have very
high probability of correct functioning at the very low probability of use.
The accuracy of continuous or periodic identification of the state of usability is an important
issue. The person stating the state of usability of basic and reserve technical systems can make
two types of errors:
• an error of the first type consists of qualifying the usable device as unfit;
• an error of the second type consists of qualifying the unfit device as usable;
The result of the erroneous statement on the system activating the emergency release of the
landing gear was the emergency landing of PLL LOT plane, Boeing 767-300ER, on November
1, 2011 at Warsaw Chopin Airport, which will be discussed in the further part of the chapter.
The wear and ageing processes of various elements are correlated with time or the functioning
duration, or with calendar time in a varying degree. Generally, the construction elements and
functional systems may be classified into three types:
• Elements having strongly correlated parameters determining the state of usability with
the functioning duration or time, which can be identified with the existence of the mem-
ory related to the past.
• Elements having poorly correlated parameters of the state of usability with the function-
ing duration or time, which imply weak relationships of operating time with the technical
condition change, wear and damage.
• Elements without correlation with the operating time, number of activation, or other
measure of the functioning duration, with randomly occurring damage.
3.2. Elements strongly correlated with functioning time
In case of elements of the first group, it is possible to create the technical condition trajectory
and to expect a moment of time, in which the limit state will occur. It is also possible to predict
a moment of the element or unit secure taking out of service. In this case, a process of damage
can be described with a suitably selected model for normal distribution, even with a small
variance [2]. The suitable quantile of the random variable of functioning duration between
damage can be a basis for developing a programme of diagnosing, maintenance and repairs.
This group of elements can include slide bearings, gears, tyre treads of gear wheels, etc. A
good model describing the time of the correct operation is normal distribution.
3.2.1. Normal distribution
The normal distribution sometimes constitutes limit distribution, to which many other types of
distribution asymptotically approach in the operational processes of devices, together with an
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increase in the number of experiments. Based on operational tests, it can be concluded that the
normal distribution provides an approximate (asymptotic) description of the random variable of T
time of proper operation of the device’s element to damage, and it can be used when the element’s
wear and ageing parameters create a continuous random process to achieve the limit state.
The random variable of T life time of tested objects has normal distribution, if its probability
density is given by the following formula:
f tð Þ ¼ 1
σ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p  exp  tmð Þ
2
2σ2
" #
(1)
where m = E(T )—expected value and σ2 ¼ D2 Tð Þ—variance of the random variable are the
distribution parameters.
The shape of f(t) density function curve of normal distribution characterises the population of
objects in terms of homogeneity. The homogeneity of the population of the same elements of
devices in terms of their durability in operation is represented by the coefficient of variation
v = σ/m (Figure 2).
For v small values, it is possible to accurately predict the moment of time for achieving the
limit state in the operating time interval (0, t),
The reliability function value is calculated as follows:
R tð Þ ¼ 1 F tð Þ ¼ 1
ðt
∞
f tð Þdt ¼
ðþ∞
t
f tð Þdt ¼ 1
σ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p
ðþ∞
t
exp  tmð Þ
2
2σ2
" #
dt (2)
In order to simplify the calculations in practice, the so-called standardised variable is adopted:
u ¼ tm
σ
(3)
it indicates a number of average (standard) deviation in terms of which the random variable Tt
being the implementation of life time of the particular i element differs from its expected value
m = E(T ).
With t = m + σu, taking into account that dt = σdu, the above formula is as follows:
f tð Þ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p  exp  u
2
2
 
(4)
However, the formula for the reliability function is as follows:
R tð Þ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p
ðþ∞
mþσu
exp  u
2
2
 
du (5)
Due to the fact that the integral
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1ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p 
ð0
∞
exp  u
2
2
 
du ¼ 0:5 (6)
and the function
1ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p
ðmþσu
0
exp  u
2
2
 
du ¼ Φ uð Þ (7)
are called the Laplace function (integral), the final form of the equation of the reliability
function will be as follows:
R uð Þ ¼ 0:5 Φ uð Þ and F uð Þ ¼ 0:5þ Φ uð Þ (8)
The above presented formulas for normal distribution of life time of the aircraft elements
provide the right accuracy of calculations at a high degree of homogeneity of a feature and
tested objects, which is characterised by small deviation values and the standard one, that is,
when the expected value E(T ) = m, where m >> σ, m > 2÷3ð Þσ is practically accepted.
In these cases, for which m
σ
< 2, it is recommended to use truncated normal distribution with
the parameters of m, σ, for which the probability density function is as follows:
f tð Þ ¼ 1
aσ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p  exp  tmð Þ
2
2σ2
" #
(9)
where m means the average life time of the object to damage, t means a current variable,
σ
2 ¼ D2 Tð Þ means a variance, while σ > 0 and t > 0, and a constant is determined on the basis
of the following formula:
a ¼ 1
F0
m
σ
(10)
Figure 2. The probability density of normal distribution for different values of v coefficient of variation.
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The use of the truncated normal distribution in the reliability tests of technical objects has the
following practical sense. The equation for the density function of the normal distribution
applies for all t values, from ∞ to þ∞. In the operational reliability tests of cars and their
elements, there is always the relationship that t > 0, for which the density function is given by
the above formula
f tð Þ ¼ 1
aσ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p  exp  tmð Þ
2
2σ2
" #
(11)
however, R(t) reliability function is provided by the following formula:
R tð Þ ¼
ð∞
t
f tð Þdt ¼ 1
aσ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p
ð∞
t
exp  tmð Þ
2
2σ2
" #
dt (12)
Because
tm
σ
¼ u (13)
where
dt ¼ σdu (14)
substituting these figures, it is possible to obtain:
R tð Þ ¼ 1
aσ
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pi
p
ð∞
mþσu
exp  1
2
u2
 
du (15)
The solution of the above integral includes the expression:
R tð Þ ¼ F0 uð Þ
F0
m
σ
  (16)
3.3. Elements poorly correlated with functioning time
The second group includes elements and structures operating in the variable conditions that are
subject to the material fatigue, vibration, corrosion, etc. The process of damage to the other
group’s elements can be described by the models with variable parameters and high dispersion,
such as: gamma, log-normal, Weibull and others [2]. The selection of operating programmes is
very difficult, especially in cases of aviation technology, where the failure of a function of the
object’s construction system threatens the safety of people, the environment or causes significant
material losses. In this case, it is important to apply the density of services, matching them to the
damage threatening the safety or the most common ones.
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With the development of the construction, it is important to mount the diagnosing systems for
tracing (monitoring) the technical condition and signalling the pre-failure states in the units
and functional systems. A certain way out of the situation involves monitoring of the course of
induced forces with the use of a system of recorders adapted to record all relevant operational
events, especially those threatening the safety of use. With the diagnosing and IT system for
monitoring the state and the process of damage, it is possible to determine the area, in which
the technical condition trajectory is placed, or to identify the durability resource.
3.3.1. Gamma distribution
In this distribution, it is assumed that for randomly selected moments of t time in the object,
the energy with the same value of individually operating induced forces (external loads) is
cumulated, and that after putting k number of induced forces, the object is damaged.
The density function of this probability is as follows:
f tð Þ ¼
1
Γ kð Þ
0
λ
ktk1eλt
for
for
t ≥ 0
t < 0
8<
: (17)
where
k—number of events enforcing the ageing process, the cumulated effects of which cause the
occurrence of damage in the object,
Γ kð Þ—gamma function is determined by the following formula:
Γ kð Þ ¼
ð∞
0
xk1exdx (18)
For total k, there is the relationship:
Γ kð Þ ¼ k 1ð Þ! (19)
and the gamma distribution is called the Erlang distribution.
In this case, F(t) distribution function has the following form:
F tð Þ ¼ 1
Xk1
n¼0
λ  tð Þn
n!
eλt (20)
In Figure 3, the gamma distribution density for various values k and λ was presented. At the
same time, it is characteristic that the individual induced force (load) action results in the
aircraft ageing (or increase of the energy cumulated in it in a stepped manner). The individual
increase of effects of such an induced force has a constant value. Furthermore, the probability
of the occurrence of the aircraft ageing increases in the time interval (t, t + Δt):
System of System Failures44
p tð Þ ¼ p ¼ λΔtþ 0Δt (21)
does not depend on the number of such increases, which occurred in time preceding tmoment. In
otherwords, the condition ‘without consequences’ that is significant for the simple Poisson’s stream
of damage is assumed. The above assumptions remain valid also for the normal distribution.
In case of the assumption that SG is a maximum permissible level of cumulation of n(t) stimuli,
which result in ageing of a tested element of the aircraft and that for the number of stimuli
N tð Þ ≥ SG (22)
this object becomes unfit for further correct operation in the system, k number of induced
forces, the cumulated energy of which is necessary for causing its damage, is calculated from
the following relationship:
k ¼
SG
y
(23)
where y means the value, by which the ageing takes place (e.g., wear) of the element in a
stepped manner under the impact of a single stimulus. However, λmagnitude is characterised
by the average intensity of the aircraft ageing:
λ ¼
1
y
¼
dE η tð Þf g
dt
(24)
By using the formula for the function of F(t) cumulated density of damage and R(t) = 1  F(t)
relationship, the element’s reliability function for the Erlang distribution will be expressed by
the following formula:
R tð Þ ¼ 1 F tð Þ ¼
Xk1
n¼0
λ  tð Þn
n!
eλt ¼ eλt
Xk1
n¼0
λ  tð Þn
n!
(25)
Figure 3. Gamma distribution density with different values k and λ.
Probabilistic Methods for Damage Assessment in Aviation Technology
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72317
45
The expected value E(T ), D2(T ) variance and v(T) coefficient of variation for this distribution is
as follows:
E Tð Þ ¼
k
λ
; D2 Tð Þ ¼
k
λ
2
; v Tð Þ ¼
D2 Tð Þ
E Tð Þ
¼
ffiffiffi
1
k
r
(26)
3.4. Elements without correlation with operating time
The elements of the third group are subject to the exponential reliability law, in which the
constant intensity of damage is assumed. The damage have a random nature and most often
come from:
• manufacture errors (material and technological errors);
• overloads of a different nature;
• non-compliance with the instructions for use or operation technology.
The elements of the third group include bodies, glass housings and covers made of plastic,
electronics components, etc.
3.4.1. Exponential distribution
If (T ) time of correct operation to damage is recorded in a continuous manner and the intensity
of damage λ tð Þ is constant and does not depend on time in the entire interval (0, t), that is,
λ tð Þ ¼ λ ¼ const (27)
the exponential distribution is used.
The F(t) distribution function of this distribution of (T ) time of the correct operation in the
interval (0,t) is calculated on the basis of the following relationship:
F tð Þ ¼ P T ≤ tf g ¼ 1 eλt ¼ 1 exp λt½  (28)
and f(t) function of distribution density for t > 0 is calculated on the basis of the relationship:
f tð Þ ¼
dF tð Þ
dt
¼ λeλt ¼ λexp λt½  (29)
where
λ > 0—means the distribution parameter (intensity of damage).
Moments of the exponential distribution are given by the following formula:
E Tð Þ ¼
1
λ
and D2 Tð Þ ¼
1
λ
2
(30)
The equality E Tð Þ ¼ 1
λ
is true only for those elements of the device, for which the intensity of
damage in the entire range of operation (0, t) is constant, and therefore, it does not increase or
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does not decrease with time of operation. The value of λ parameter affects the shape of the
exponential distribution density curve presented in Figure 4.
When t < 0, the function is f(t) = 0,
When (Tk) time of proper operation to damage is treated discretely [3] (e.g., by K1 number of
activating the object without damage to the moment of K activation, during which the failure
will occur). Then, the geometric distribution is used. The F(t) distribution function of (Tk) time
for proper operation is calculated in the following way:
F tð Þ ¼ P Tk ≤Kf g ¼ 1 1 pð Þ
kþ1 (31)
where
p—means the probability of damage to the unit at K activation, it can be also calculated from
the relationship providing the approximate values:
F tð Þ ¼ P T ≤Kf g ¼ 1 e
K
E Tð Þ ¼ 1 exp 
K
E Tð Þ
 
(32)
where
E Tð Þ—expected value of time of proper operation to damage.
Therefore, for the purposes of operation, it is possible to use the following formula:
R tð Þ ¼ exp λt½  ¼ exp 
t
E Tð Þ
 
(33)
In relation to the fact that F(t) distribution function is the complement to the reliability function
unity:
R tð Þ þ F tð Þ ¼ 1 (34)
Figure 4. Example courses of the exponential distribution density for different values of the parameter λ.
Probabilistic Methods for Damage Assessment in Aviation Technology
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72317
47
then, R(t) for the geometric distribution is:
R tð Þ ¼ 1 1 exp 
K
E Tð Þ
  
¼ exp 
K
E Tð Þ
 
(35)
and for the exponential distribution, R(t) is:
R tð Þ ¼ 1 1 exp λtð Þ
	 

¼ exp λtð Þ (36)
In Figure 5, the reliability functions R tð Þ ¼ P T > tf g of the geometric distribution and the
exponential distribution were presented. In the first case, the graph constitutes a step curve.
However, the second graph constitutes a continuous curve. It was assumed that the parame-
ters p and λ of both functions are the same, and their value is p = λ = 0.1.
Another way, which makes it possible to estimate the probability values of the occurrence of
catastrophic damage in the aircraft devices, can include the use of models, including the limit state.
4. Estimation of the average number of the aircraft failure within a given
period
A quantitative description and probability evaluation of damage to the basic and protection
systems of the aircraft can be carried out in accordance with the postulates of the Poisson
process [4].
Assuming that:
• probability of damage is directly proportional to the length of the concerned time period
and the number of operated aircraft;
• proportionality factor identifying the risk of damage is constant;
Figure 5. Reliability function courses; distribution: a—geometric, b—exponential.
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The following system of equations is right:
P0 tþ Δtð Þ ¼ P0 tð Þ 1 λN tð ÞΔtð Þ
P1 tþ Δtð Þ ¼ P1 tð Þ 1 λN tð ÞΔtð Þ þ P0 tð ÞλN tð ÞΔt
⋮
Pn tþ Δtð Þ ¼ Pn tð Þ 1 λN tð ÞΔtð Þ þ Pn1 tð ÞλN tð ÞΔt
for n > 0
(37)
where
P0 t; tþ Δtð Þ—probability of non-occurrence of damage to basic and protection systems in the
time interval of Δt;
Pi t; tþ Δtð Þ, (i = 1,…n)—probability of the occurrence of ‘i’ number of damage in the time
interval of Δt;
N tð Þ—number of operated aircraft, in which the considered damage may occur;
λ—proportionality factor that represents the damage risk;
Δ t—adopted time interval of aircraft operation (or the aircraft’s flying time length).
By dividing Eq. (37) by Δ t and going to the border with Δ t! 0, it is possible to obtain the
following system of equations:
P
0
0 ¼ λN tð ÞP0 tð Þ
P
0
1 ¼ λN tð ÞP1 tð Þ þ λN tð ÞP0 tð Þ
⋮
P
0
n
¼ λN tð ÞPn tð Þ þ λN tð ÞPn1 tð Þ
(38)
For the system of equations (38), the initial conditions are as follows:
P0 0ð Þ ¼ 1
Pn 0ð Þ ¼ 0 for n > 0
(
(39)
Equation (38) is a linear differential equation and it is solved recursively. First, P0 tð Þ is found.
By having the knowledge of P0 tð Þ, then, P1 tð Þ is determined, and so on.
The solution of the system of equations (39) takes the form of:
P0 tð Þ ¼ e
λ
ðt
0
N tð Þdt
⋮
Pn tð Þ ¼
1
n!
λ
ðt
0
N tð Þdt
2
4
3
5
n
e
λ
ðt
0
N Lð Þdt
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
(40)
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The probability that n damage requiring the launch of protection systems will occur in the time
interval (0,t) is described with the Poisson distribution, whereas the role of the expression ‘λt’
is replaced with the following magnitude λ
Ðt
0
N tð Þdt due to the low frequency of the occurrence
of this type of damage in the process of the aircraft operation.
The integral
Ðt
0
N tð Þdt can be replaced with the following total:
ðt
0
N tð Þdt$
XN
i¼1
ti (41)
where
N—number of aircraft operated within the considered time;
ti—flying time of the aircraft within the considered time.
For a single aircraft, the probability of the damage occurrence during the considered t flying
time will be:
q1 ¼ 1 e
λt (42)
where
q
1—probability of damage in one aircraft;
t—aircraft’s flying time.
Since λ risk of damage to both systems (basic and protection) that causes the failure is low, the
expression eλt can be expanded into a power series.
Hence
eλt ffi 1 λt (43)
By substituting Eq. (43) to (42), the following is obtained:
q
2 ffi lt (44)
With the relationship (44), it is possible to estimate the probability of the failure occurrence in a
single aircraft.
The probability of correct aircraft functioning is expressed by the following relationship:
P1 ¼ 1 bλt (45)
In order to estimate the average number of failures during a given period for the operated
aircraft park, the following relationship can be used:
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E n½  ¼
X∞
n¼1
nPn tð Þ ¼ bλ
XN
i¼1
ti (46)
where
ti—flying time within a given period of i aircraft
N—number of operated aircraft.
We are often interested not only in the probability that n damage will occur for given flying
time, but in the magnitude of λ coefficient characterising the intensity (risk) of the damage
occurrence. In order to determine the estimator of λ parameter, a maximum likelihood method
will be used. It should be supposed that we observed and recorded the occurrence of damage
in several separate time intervals, when the aircraft’s flying time was: t1, t2,…, ti. As a result of
the observation, the following was obtained:
• in the interval (0, t1), n1 of damage occurred;
• in the interval (t1, t2), n2 of damage occurred;
⋮
• in the interval (ti1, ti), ni of damage occurred;
The probability of the occurrence of the said number of damage, that is, n1+ n2 +…+ ni during
operation with the intensity of their occurrence of λ is expressed by the relationship:
L ¼
λT1ð Þ
n1
ni!
eλT1 
λT2ð Þ
n2
n2!
eλT2⋯
λTið Þ
ni
ni!
eλT1
¼
λ
n1þn2þ…þniT
n1
1 T
n2
2 … T
ni
i
n1!n2! …ni!
eλ T1þT2þ…þTið Þ
(47)
where
Ti ¼ ti  ti1 (48)
The above recorded probability, considered as a function of λ variable, at defined n1, n2,…, ni,
T1,T2,…Ti is called the likelihood. Currently, such a value of λ, for which L likelihood adopts the
greatest value, is found. For this purpose, relationship (47) is subjected to logarithms and a
derivative in relation to λ, which is equated to zero, is calculated. By solving the obtained
equation in this manner, it is possible to find the relationship for λ.
Hence
bλ ¼ n1 þ n2 þ…þ ni
T1 þ T2 þ…þ Ti
(49)
With the help of the relationship (49), the estimator of λ coefficient with the use of the
maximum likelihood method is determined.
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Hence, relationship (47) takes the following form:
bq ¼ bλt (50)
where
t—aircraft’s flying time within the year.
Relationship (50) makes it possible to estimate the probability of the damage occurrence in a
single aircraft within a given time interval.
5. Catastrophic damage model of the device including the limit state
These models can be used for determination of the probability of the occurrence of various
negative events in the devices for the following cases:
• when the parameter, specifying their state, will exceed the limit state;
• when a chance of the catastrophic damage occurrence is constant along the increasing
parameter, which evaluates its state;
• when a chance of the catastrophic damage occurrence increases together with an increase
in the parameter, which evaluates its state;
• when the parameters determining a chance of the damage occurrence constitute random
variables.
It is assumed that:
• The device’s technical condition is determined by one dominant diagnostic parameter. Its
current value is determined by z.
• A change in the diagnostic parameter value occurs only during the aircraft flight:
• The parameter z is non-decreasing.
May Uz, t mean the probability that in the moment of t, the diagnostic parameter value will be
equal to z. For example, it can be assumed that z may mean, for example, the crack length or
the surface wear value.
In order to describe an increase in the parameter value in the random basis, the following
differential equation was adopted:
Uz, tþΔt ¼ 1 λΔtð ÞUz, t þ λΔtUzΔz, t (51)
where
Δz—increase in the diagnostic parameter value during one flight of the aircraft;
λΔt—probability of the aircraft flight in the time interval of Δt, whereas λΔt ≤ 1;
λ—intensity of the aircraft flights.
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Eq. (51) in the function notation adopts the following form:
u z; tþ Δtð Þ ¼ 1 λΔtð Þu z; tð Þ þ λΔtu z Δz; tð Þ (52)
where
u z; tð Þ—density function of the diagnostic parameter z at the time of t.
After taking into account the physics of the diagnostic parameter increase and appropriate
transformation, the Fokker-Planck differential equation is obtained from Eq. (52). As a result of
solving this equation, the following density function is obtained:
u z; tð Þ ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2piat
p e zbtð Þ
2
2at (53)
where
b—average increase in the diagnostic parameter per time unit;
a—average increase square of the diagnostic parameter per time unit;
The probability of the catastrophic damage occurrence with the use of the relationship (53) can
be presented in the following way:
Q t; zdð Þ ¼
ð∞
zd
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2piat
p e zbtð Þ
2
2at dz (54)
where
zd—diagnostic parameter value specifying the limit state.
The risk level of the catastrophic damage occurrence in the operating time function can be
determined after transformation of relationship (54) as follows [5]:
Q tð Þzd ¼
ðt
0
f tð Þzddt (55)
where
f tð Þzd ¼
zd þ bt
2t
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2piat
p e
zdbtð Þ2
2at (56)
6. Assessment of a chance of the catastrophic damage occurrence with
the constant level along the increasing diagnostic parameter value
In point 5, a case of the device operation, when the catastrophic damage occurred only after
exceeding the limit state by the diagnostic parameter value, was considered. Currently, the next
case is considered, when the opportunity of additional one (the second type of catastrophic
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damage), possible to be implemented in every moment of the aircraft operation, is added to the
previous one.
Additionally, the intensity of the occurrence of this type of additional damage will be intro-
duced:
μ ¼
P
Δt
) P ¼ μΔt ≤ 1 (57)
where
P—probability of the occurrence of this type of damage in a single aircraft flight;
Δt—time interval, in which the flight is to take place;
μ—additional damage intensity.
Other necessary parameters and magnitudes in this point will be the same as in point 4. The
differential equation, in order to describe an increase in the value of the diagnostic parameter
changes, adopts the following form (in the function notation):
u z; tþ Δtð Þ ¼ 1 λΔtð Þ 1 Pð Þu z; tð Þ þ λΔt 1 Pð Þu z Δz; tð Þ (58)
From Eq. (58) after transformation, the following partial differential equation is obtained:
∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
¼ μu z; tð Þ  b tð Þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
a tð Þ
∂
2
u z; tð Þ
∂z2
(59)
where
b tð Þ—average increase in the diagnostic parameter per time unit;
b tð Þ ¼ λ 1 Pð ÞΔz (60)
a tð Þ—average increase in the diagnostic parameter’s current value per time unit;
a tð Þ ¼ λ 1 Pð ÞΔz2 (61)
Δz—increase in the diagnostic parameter value during one flight (determined with the use of
accuracy of changes in this parameter).
In Ref. [2], it was shown that the equation solution (59) adopts the following form:
u z; tð Þ ¼ μeμtu z; tð Þ (62)
where
u z; tð Þ ¼
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2πA tð Þ
p e zB tð Þð Þ22A tð Þ (63)
B tð Þ ¼
ðt
0
b tð Þdt (64)
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A tð Þ ¼
ð
a tð Þdt (65)
By using relationship (62), it is possible to determine the additional catastrophic damage
occurrence within the range of 0; tð Þ.
Q1 tð Þ ¼
ðt
0
μeμt
ð∞
∞
u z; tð Þdz
2
4
3
5dt ¼ 1 eμt (66)
Hence, it is possible to write the relationship for the total probability of the occurrence of both
types of catastrophic damage in the time interval 0; tð Þ:
Q tð Þ ¼ 1 eμt
 
þ eμt
ð∞
zd
u z; tð Þdz (67)
The formula for the aircraft reliability adopts the following form:
R tð Þ ¼ eμt
ðzd
∞
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2πA tð Þ
p e zB tð Þð Þ22A tð Þ (68)
where B tð Þ and A tð Þ specific relationships (64) and (65).
7. Model outline of the catastrophic damage occurrence with the increasing
chance of its occurrence together with the diagnostic parameter increase
In order to solve the problem, The Yule’s process will be used by carrying out its modifica-
tion. The method of this modification is provided in Ref. [6]. In this case, it is necessary to
perform the diagnostic parameter value discretisation. The discretisation method is pro-
vided in Figure 6.
where
Ek—diagnostic parameter value states.
λΔt—probability of the aircraft flight, as result of which a change in the state may occur.
Figure 6. Discretisation diagram of the diagnostic parameter.
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qk tð Þ—probability of the development process interruption (i.e., state changes). This probabil-
ity depends on the state.
h—average value of the diagnostic parameter increase in time Δt (one flight).
May Pk tð Þ mean the probability that in the moment of t, the diagnostic parameter value
achieved the state Ek (where k ¼ 1, 2,…).
For these arrangements, it is possible to arrange the following system of the infinite number of
equations:
P0 tþ Δtð Þ ¼ P0 tð Þ 1 μ0 þ λ
 
Δt
	 

þ 0 Δtð Þ
⋮ for k ¼ 1, 2,…
Pk tþ Δtð Þ ¼ Pk tð Þ 1 μ0 þ kμþ λ
 
Δt
	 

þ Pk1 tð ÞλΔtþ 0 Δtð Þ
(69)
After division of both sides of k equation by Δt and transition to the border at Δt ! 0, the
following system of equations is obtained:
P
0
0 tð Þ ¼  μ0 þ λ
 
P0 tð Þ
⋮ for k ¼ 1, 2,…
P
0
k tð Þ ¼  μ0 þ λþ kμ
 
Pk tð Þ þ λPk tð Þ
(70)
The initial condition for each of these equations is as follows:
Pi 0ð Þ ¼
1 dla i ¼ 0
0 dla i 6¼ 0

(71)
The system of Eq. (70) is solved recursively. Having the results of the solved system of equations,
it is possible to determine the probability (reliability) that in the time interval 0; tð Þ, the cata-
strophic damage will not occur. This relationship can be determined by adding up the obtained
relationships Pk tð Þ. Hence
R tð Þ ¼
X∞
k¼0
Pk tð Þ (72)
The probability of the fact that to the moment of t, the catastrophic damage will occur, can be
specified by the following relationship:
Q tð Þ ¼ P T ≤ tf g ¼ 1 R tð Þ (73)
After the adding up operation performance, the following form of the solution is obtained [6]:
Q tð Þ ¼ 1 e
λ
μ λþμ0ð Þtλμeμt (74)
Hence, the time distribution density to the moment of the catastrophic damage occurrence.
f tð Þ ¼ μ0 þ λ 1 e
μt
 	 

e
λ
μ 1e
μtð Þ λþμ0ð Þt (75)
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8. Outline of the aircraft reliability assessment method taking into
account signalled and catastrophic damage
8.1. Description of operation conditions and adoption of assumptions
It is assumed that the aircraft operation is done in such a way that the following arrangements
and assumptions are correct:
1. In order to assess the technical condition, n diagnostic parameters are used. So the techni-
cal condition vector adopts the following form [7]:
x ¼ x1; x2;…; xnð Þ (76)
2. Instead of the diagnostic parameter values in the reliability assessment, the following
deviations are used:
zi ¼ xi  xi nom i ¼ 1; 2;…; nð Þ (77)
where
xi—i diagnostic parameter.
xi nom—nominal value of i parameter.
3. Deviation values zi (i = 1, 2,…, n) are positive.
4. The deviation limit values are zdi . If 0 ≤ zi < z
d
i i ¼ 1; 2;…; nð Þ, the aircraft is operational.
When at least one deviation exceeds the limit value, the aircraft is considered to be unfit
for operation.
5. It is assumed that zi i ¼ 1; 2;…; nð Þ deviations are independent random variables, that is,
a change in the value of one deviation does not change the value of other deviation.
6. The change in zi deviation values occurs as a result of the aircraft operation, which is
during the aircraft flight.
7. The speed of changes in the deviation values can be described with the use of the
following relationship:
dzi
dN
¼ g zi; cið Þ (78)
where
zi—diagnostic parameter deviation;
ci—indicators characterising the local operating conditions of elements, which the increase
in the diagnostic parameter’s deviation value depends on;
N—number of aircraft flights.
By using relationship (78), it is possible to determine the deviation value during one flight:
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Δzi ¼ g zi; cið ÞΔN for ΔN ¼ 1 (79)
8. The intensity of the aircraft flights λ is determined by the following relationship:
λ ¼
P
Δt
(80)
where
Δt—is the time interval, in which the aircraft flight will take place with P probability. The
time interval of Δt should be properly selected (depending on functioning of the aircraft
operating system), for λΔt ≤ 1.
By using the intensity of flights λ, it is possible to determine the number of performed
flights of the aircraft to the moment of t in accordance with the following relationship:
N ¼ λt (81)
9. It is assumed that the aircraft is operated. The task of the technical service is, among
others, not to allow for the occurrence of signalled damage and to maximally limit the
possibility of the occurrence of catastrophic damage, which is the cause of the aircraft
failures and crashes.
10. It is assumed that the sets of signalled and catastrophic damage to the aircraft are sepa-
rate. Hence, the aircraft reliability in this case can be written in the following form:
R tð Þ ¼ R1 tð ÞR2 tð Þ (82)
where
R1 tð Þ—probability of the fact that to the moment t there will be no catastrophic (sudden)
damage in the aircraft.
R2 tð Þ—probability of the fact that to the moment t there will be no damage signalled in the
aircraft.
Despite the attempts and great effort of technical services, currently, it is impossible to
completely eliminate the risk of the catastrophic damage occurrence.
It is adopted that in case of a single flight of the aircraft, the probability determining the
possibility of the catastrophic damage occurrence is Q. The progressive technical service of the
aircraft is to prevent this probability increase together with an increase in operating time.
8.2. Aircraft reliability determination including signalled and catastrophic damage
Under the adopted probabilistic assumptions, a description of the deviation increase of diag-
nostic parameters in the function of the aircraft operating time can be considered separately for
each diagnostic parameter. In view of the above, it is assumed that the process of deviation
changes of i diagnostic parameter is considered.
May Uzi, t mean the probability of the fact that in the moment t, the deviation of i parameter is zi.
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For the adopted arrangements, the dynamics of changes (increase) of i deviation can be
characterised with the use of the following differential equation [3]:
Uzi, tþΔ t ¼ 1 λΔtð ÞUzi , t þ λΔt UziΔzi, t (83)
where
1 λΔtð Þ—probability of the fact that in the time interval of Δt, the aircraft flight will not take
place;
λΔt—probability of the aircraft flight in the time interval of Δt.
Hence 1 λΔtð Þ þ λΔt ¼ 1
Eq. (83) expresses the following sense. The probability of the fact that in the moment of tþ Δt,
the deviation value of i diagnostic parameter will be zi, if in tmoment, it had this value and did
not increase because of the lack of the aircraft flight or, in tmoment, it had zi  Δzi value and in
the time interval of Δt, Δzi increased, because the flight did not take place.
Differential Eq. (83), in the function notation, adopts the following form:
u zi; tþ Δtð Þ ¼ 1 λΔtð Þ u zi; tð Þ þ λΔtu zi  Δzi; tð Þ (84)
where
u zi; tð Þ—deviation density function of i diagnostic parameter from the nominal value.
Differential Eq. (84) can be transformed to the partial differential equation, with the use of the
following approximation:
u zi; tþ Δtð Þ ¼ u zi; tð Þ þ
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂ t
Δt
u zi  Δzi; tð Þ ¼ u zi; tð Þ 
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂ zi
Δzi þ
1
2
∂
2
u zi; tð Þ
∂ z2
i
Δ zið Þ
2
(85)
By substituting Eqs. (85) to (84), it is possible to obtain:
u zi; tð Þ þ
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂z
Δt ¼ 1 λΔtð Þ u zi; tð Þ þ λΔt u z1; tð Þ 
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂zi
Δzi þ
1
2
∂
2
u zi; tð Þ
∂z2
i
Δzið Þ
2
" #
(86)
Hence, after simplification, the following is obtained:
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂t
Δ t ¼ λΔziΔt
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂zi
þ
1
2
λΔt Δzið Þ
2 ∂
2
u zi; tð Þ
∂z2
i
(87)
By dividing two sides of (87) equation by Δt, the following is obtained:
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂t
¼ bi tð Þ
∂u zi; tð Þ
∂zi
þ
1
2
ai tð Þ
∂
2
u zi; tð Þ
∂z2
i
(88)
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where
bi tð Þ ¼ λΔzi—means the average increase of i deviation of the diagnostic parameter from the
normal value per time unit;
ai tð Þ ¼ λ Δzið Þ
2
—means the average increase square of i deviation from the normal value per
time unit;
Δzi—is determined by relationship (79) for ΔN = 1.
The solution of the specific Eq. (88), which meets the following conditions, is searched for:
when t! 0, the equation is convergent to the Dirac function, that is, u zi; tð Þ ! 0, dla z 6¼ 0
u 0; tð Þ ! ∞ but in a way that the integral of u function is equal to the unity for t > 0.
For such an adopted condition, the equation solution (88) adopts the form:
u zi; tð Þ ¼
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2piAi tð Þ
p e ziBi tð Þð Þ
2
2Ai tð Þ (89)
where
Bi tð Þ ¼
ðt
0
bi tð Þdt (90)
Ai tð Þ ¼
ðt
0
ai tð Þdt (91)
Relationship (90) determines the average value of the deviation, and relationship (91) deter-
mines the deviation variance.
By using relationship (89), the reliability in the aspect of the damage signalled for i diagnostic
parameter can be written in the following form:
Ri tð Þ ffi
ðzdi
∞
u zi; tð Þ d zi (92)
By taking into account all the diagnostic parameters and adopted assumptions, the reliability
formula adopts the following form:
R2 tð Þ ¼
Yn
i¼1
Ri tð Þ (93)
Now the relationship for the second component of R1(t) aircraft reliability is determined due to
the catastrophic damage.
The catastrophic (sudden) damage is caused by incomplete control and knowledge of the
aircraft technical condition.
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It results from the aircraft operation that a group of damage occurs as a result of sudden
changes in measurable and non-measurable parameters due to the inability to observe the
changes of their values. The exceeding of the applicable limits also affects an increase in the
risk of the aircraft catastrophic damage occurrence.
The damage intensity plays a basic role in the probabilistic description of the occurrence of this
type of damage.
The intensity of damage is expressed by the following relationship:
χ tð Þ ¼ lim
Δt!0þ
P t < T < tþ ΔtjT > tð Þ
Δt
(94)
where
T—time random variable to the catastrophic damage occurrence;
t—aircraft operation time;
P()—contingent event probability.
From relationship (94), after transformation, it is possible to obtain the following differential
equation:
R
0
1 tð Þ þ χ tð ÞR2 tð Þ ¼ 0 (95)
Eq. (95), for the initial condition R1 t ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1, has the following solution:
R1 tð Þ ¼ e

Ðt
0
χ tð Þdt
(96)
If
χ tð Þ ¼ χ ¼ const, then:
R1 tð Þ ¼ e
χ t
(97)
In order to use relationship (95), it is important to estimate χ parameter. Based on the observa-
tions of operation of a specific type of aircraft, it is possible to obtain the times of the occur-
rence of this type of damage tk, where k = 1, 2,…, ω.
Time tk is time for the occurrence of the first of this type of damage in k aircraft calculated from
the beginning of operation.
In order to estimate χ parameter, a method of moments will be used. The comparison of the
expected value of operating time calculated from the theoretical relationship, with the average
value determined on the basis of the observation, will be made.
The theoretical average time of given operation to the moment of the catastrophic damage
occurrence is:
E T½  ¼
ð∞
0
R1 tð Þdt ¼
ð∞
0
eχt ¼
1
χ
(98)
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The average value of the aircraft operating time (from the moment of the catastrophic damage
occurrence) calculated on the basis of the observation will be:
E
_
T½  ¼
Pω
k¼1
tk
ω
(99)
Hence
1
χ∗
¼
Xω
k¼1
tk
ω
χ∗ ¼
ω
Xω
k¼1
tk
(100)
If the probability of the sudden damage occurrence during one flight is known, the intensity of
this type of damage can be estimated by the following relationship:
χ∗ ¼
Q
Δt
(101)
The relationship for estimation of R1(t) reliability will be:
R1 tð Þ ¼ e
χ∗t (102)
After taking into account relationships (93) and (102), the aircraft reliability formula will be:
R tð Þ ¼ eχt
Yn
i¼1
Ri tð Þ (103)
8.3. Modification of the applied method for the aircraft reliability determination
including sudden and signalled damage
By starting the modification of the applied method in point ‘8.2’, the following additional
assumptions are adopted:
• The aircraft catastrophic damage causes its withdrawal from operation;
• It is assumed that there is one dominant parameter among diagnostic parameters. Its
dynamics of changes is the greatest, and due to its causes, the signalled damage is formed
in the quickest manner.
• The probabilities associated with the aircraft flight frequency and the possibility of its
withdrawal from operation constitutes separate, independent sets of events.
λΔtþ 1 λΔtð Þ ¼ 1 (104)
χΔtþ 1 χΔtð Þ ¼ 1 (105)
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For such specified probabilities, the following equation is right:
1 λΔtð Þ 1 χΔtð Þ þ λΔt 1 χΔtð Þ þ 1 λΔtð ÞχΔtþ λΔtχΔt ¼ 1 (106)
But
χ ¼
Q
Δt
(107)
Hence
1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð Þ þ λΔt 1Qð Þ þ 1 λΔtð Þ Qþ λΔt Q ¼ 1 (108)
1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð Þ þ λΔt 1Qð Þ þ Q ¼ 1 (109)
The description of deviation changes in the dominant diagnostic parameter currently marked
with z will be started. The variable z has the same meaning as zi used in point ‘7.2’ and the
regularities of its increase are the same as zi.
May Uz,t mean the probability that in the moment t, the dominant diagnostic parameter
deviation is z.
By using relationship (109) and assuming that z deviation increase is determined by first two
components of this relationship, the differential Eq. (83) can be written in the following form:
Uz, tþΔt ¼ 1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð ÞUz, t þ λΔt 1Qð ÞUzΔz, t (110)
Eq. (109) in the function notation adopts the following form:
u z; tþ Δtð Þ ¼ 1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð Þu z; tð Þ þ λΔt 1Qð Þu z Δz; tð Þ (111)
Eq. (111) is transformed into the partial differential equation with the use of the approximation
(85) and relationship (109).
For greater transparency, u(z,t) is added to and subtracted from the right side of Eq. (111).
After completing these operations, the following is obtained:
u z; tð Þ þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
Δt ¼ u z; tð Þ  u z; tð Þ þ 1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð Þu z; tð Þþ
þ λΔt 1Qð Þ u z; tð Þ  Δz
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
Δzð Þ2
∂
2u z; tð Þ
∂z2
  (112)
Hence
u z; tð Þ  u z; tð Þ þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
Δt ¼  1 λΔtð Þ 1Qð Þ þ λΔt 1Qð Þ þQð Þu z; tð Þþ
þ λΔ t 1Qð Þ u z; tð Þ  Δz
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
Δzð Þ2
∂
2u z; tð Þ
∂z2
  (113)
Finally, the following partial differential equation is obtained:
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∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
¼ χu z; tð Þ  b tð Þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
a tð Þ
∂
2u z; tð Þ
∂z2
(114)
where
χ—intensity of the withdrawal of a specific type of aircraft due to the catastrophic damage
occurrence:
χ ¼
Q
Δt
(115)
b(t)—average increase in the dominant parameter deviation per time unit:
b tð Þ ¼ λ 1Qð ÞΔz (116)
a(t)—average increase square of the dominant parameter deviation per time unit:
a tð Þ ¼ λ 1Qð ÞΔz2 (117)
Δz—specified by relationship (79).
Eq. (114) is more general than the Fokker-Planck equation, written in the form of the relation-
ship (88).
Eq. (114) has an additional element ‘-χu(z,t)’.
In order to present the equation solution (114), the equation solution (88) will be used. If the
equation solution (88) constitutes the relationship (89), then, the equation solution (114) con-
stitutes the following function:
u z; tð Þ ¼ χeχt u z; tð Þ (118)
where
u z; tð Þ—is the equation solution (88) and is presented by the relationship (89). In this solution,
in the integrals (90) and (91), it is important to use the relationships (116) and (117).
In order to justify that the function (118) is the equation solution (114), the following transfor-
mation is presented:
A derivative after the relationship time (118) is calculated.
∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
¼ χ2eχtu z; tð Þ þ χeχt
∂u z; tð Þ
∂t
¼
¼ χu z; tð Þ þ χeχt b tð Þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
a tð Þ
∂
2u z; tð Þ
∂z2
 
¼
¼ χu z; tð Þ  b tð Þ
∂u z; tð Þ
∂z
þ
1
2
a tð Þ
∂
2u z; tð Þ
∂z2
(119)
Hence, it can be observed that the function (118) is the equation solution (114).
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Function (114) has the density function characteristics, because:
ð∞
∞
ð∞
0
u z; tð Þdz dt ¼
ð∞
0
ð∞
∞
u z; tð Þdz
2
4
3
5dt ¼ 1 (120)
By using relationship (118), the aircraft unreliability is determined
Q tð Þ ¼
ðt
0
χeχt
ðzd
∞
u z; tð Þdzþ
ð∞
zd
u z; tð Þdz
2
4
3
5dt ¼ 1 eχt (121)
Thus, it is possible to write that:
Q tð Þ ¼ Q1 tð ÞR2 tð Þ þQ1 tð ÞQ2 tð Þ (122)
where
Q1 tð Þ—unreliability caused by the aircraft catastrophic damage;
Q2 tð Þ—unreliability caused by the deviation increase of the dominant parameter above the
limit value.
R1 tð Þ—aircraft reliability referring to the catastrophic damage;
R2 tð Þ—aircraft reliability referring to the dominant parameter;
Thus, the aircraft reliability will be:
R tð Þ ¼ R1 tð Þ  R2 tð Þ (123)
Hence
R tð Þ þQ tð Þ ¼ 1 (124)
Thus, the aircraft reliability formula will be:
R tð Þ ¼ eχt
ðzd
∞
1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2piA tð Þ
p e zB tð Þð Þ22A tð Þ dz (125)
where
B(t) and A(t) are determined by relationships (90) and (91).
The above method applies to the cases, in which the effects of action of destructive processes
cumulate, that are correlated with the aircraft operating time and this process is disrupted by
the possibility of the occurrence of the sudden damage caused by, for example, overload
pulses, hard landings, etc.
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This method may allow to estimate durability, due to individual diagnostic parameters. The
data obtained in this way can be used in order to improve the technical service. The sequence
of diagnostic controls adequately spread over operating time allows to prevent the signalled
damage occurrence.
Therefore, it can be assumed that:
R2 tð Þ ¼
Yn
i¼1
ðzd
∞
u1 zi; tð Þdzi ≈ 1 (126)
The aircraft reliability, including the technical service, can be estimated by the following
relationship:
R tð Þ ¼ eχ
∗t (127)
The presented methods for determining the relationships for the aircraft reliability are condi-
tioned by the adopted assumptions. They can be modified in accordance with the assump-
tions. The more accurately the adopted assumptions will reflect the actual conditions, the more
precisely the aircraft reliability will be estimated. The methods can be adapted to specific cases
for determination of the catastrophic damage probability values, including the physics of
occurring phenomena and operating conditions. The aircraft reliability forecasts can be used
for consideration of specific problems with the reliability assessment and durability of ele-
ments, units and devices.
9. Reliability incorrect assessment results in air systems
9.1. Analysis of errors of diagnosing and stating the usability state of technical systems
The reliability of diagnostic equipment and the ergonomics of technical systems affect the
errors made by the operator. The chapter raised the problem of diagnosis errors and erroneous
usability evaluation and describes the example of a real event of the aircraft landing without
the released landing gear, as a consequence of erroneous diagnosing. The rescue process in a
situation of an aviation accident hazard was briefly described in this chapter. A person
equipped with diagnostic equipment can make two types of errors, whose measurements are
the occurrence probabilities marked with symbols α and β.
α—means an error of the first type, which consists of qualifying the usable device as unfit;
β—means an error of the second type, which consists of qualifying the unfit device as usable.
Making the first type error in the identification process of the aircraft’s usability may cause
losses due to unplanned downtime and repeated inspection. In case of making the second type
error, more dangerous consequences with the possibility of an aviation accident are often
caused;
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Three factors determining identification errors can be mentioned:
• monitoring susceptibility of the object: it shows the extent, to which the object is adapted
to the inspection, and a way in which the inspection procedures identify the actual state,
as well the percentage of features not subject to the inspection;
• technical equipment of the operator inspecting the state of the object and procedures of
interpreting the results
• predispositions of the operator, his or her qualifications, personal characteristics;
• circumstances of the inspection, climatic conditions, time stress, information stress, etc.
As it results from the above considerations, the identification error is a parameter of the
systemic nature. The object designer, the designer of diagnostic equipment, the operator
equipped with diagnostic equipment of sufficient quality and the training of the operator
conducting identification are responsible for the object state identification error. Despite the
fact that the identification error depends on many factors, it is the person conducting the
identification who is legally and morally responsible for the effects resulting from the identifi-
cation error. The removal of responsibility from the operator follows the specified tests
conducted by the specially appointed expert teams. These teams often include also experts
from scientific and research institutions. These teams determine the causes of the erroneous
qualification of the object condition. It results in a stressful situation for the operator, who does
not always understand the essence of various sources of misidentification, blaming himself or
herself for adverse events. The problem of the first and second type errors during the identifi-
cation of the usability state has a legal-moral, economic and technical aspect.
The source of the error is sometimes unreliability of diagnosing units equipped with the
necessary equipment and procedures of stating the usability state. With regard to the object,
on which the condition is identified, it can be said that there are the following events on it:
A01—The event involving the fact that the object is in the state of usability and it will keep this
state during the identification. The probability of such an event is marked with P01.
A02—The event involving the occurrence of damage detected in the identification process in
the object until or during identification. The probability of such an event is q02.
A03—The event involving the occurrence of damage not detected during the identification in
the object until or during the identification process. The probability of such an event is marked
with q03.
These probabilities meet the condition:
P01 þ q02 þ q03 ¼ 1 (128)
The diagnosis process may include the following events:
A11—The event involving the fact that the diagnosis is correctly carried out and the object state
statement is flawless. The probability of such an event is P11.
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A12—The event involving the fact that the object was considered unfit regardless of its state.
The probability of such an event is q12.
A13—The event involving the fact that the object was considered usable regardless of its state.
The probability of such an event is q13.
A14—The event involving the fact that the object was considered unfit, whereas, in fact, it is
usable, and the object was considered usable, whereas, in fact, it is unfit. The probability of
such an event is marked with q14.
These probabilities meet the condition:
P11 þ q12 þ q13 þ q14 ¼ 1 (129)
The probability of an event involving the fact that the object considered unfit, in fact, is usable,
that is, making the first type error is given by the following formula:
α ¼ 1
P01
1
q02 P11q14ð Þ
P11þq13
(130)
The probability of an event involving the fact that the object will be considered usable, whereas
it is, in fact, unfit, that is, making the second type error is given by the following formula:
β ¼ 1
1
1þ P01
1P01þq02
P11q14
q12q14
(131)
The impact of possible events is the process of diagnosis on the values of the first and second
type errors results from the provided formulas.
9.2. Shaping of the first and second type errors by the operator teaching method
Figure 7 shows the course of function αm of reducing the error of the first type as a result of m
repetition of action performed by the operator or diagnosing team for different values of the
experimentally determined coefficient C αð Þ.
These errors in the function of the number of m tests are given by the following formulas:
αm ¼ α 1 α C αð Þ½ 
m1 (132)
βm ¼ β 1 β C β
 	 
m1
(133)
The intensity of learning has a significant impact on the reduction of the first and second type
errors. As a result of the training, the operator learns using the controls, reading instrument
indications and interpretation of symptoms of the object’s usability and unfitness. For the
purposes of teaching the operator, the specific states are modelled. As a result of conducted
research and analyses, C αð Þ, C β
 
coefficients characterising the quantitative progress of the
training and the intensity of reducing the first and second type errors are determined.
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9.3. Example result of erroneous diagnosing
The fact of a certain error in diagnosing can be stated on the example of the above-mentioned
emergency landing of the PLL LOT plane, Boeing 767-300ER, on November 1, 2011 at Warsaw
Chopin Airport. It should be reminded that the Boeing 767-300 plane of the Polish airlines LOT
departed from the Newark airport (USA) after midnight on November 1, 2011. Thirty minutes
after the takeoff from Newark, the crew of the Polish plane signalled a failure of the central
hydraulic system. The machine had another system, the emergency and electrical one, which
could retract the landing gear. After the departure, the plane was filled with fuel and despite
the failure it would not be justified to fly around over the U.S. territory for many hours because
only after fuel consumption, it would be possible to check the operation of the system
extending the landing gear and to try to land. The captain decided to continue the flight,
although he could not be sure as to the emergency system usability, and he intended to verify
the operation in the territory of Poland. Over Warsaw, it occurred that the usability of the
entire landing gear control system was evaluated erroneously because its extension failed,
although the flaps had extended. Then, the decision on emergency landing was made. The
result of the incorrect evaluation of the situation described above was the plane failure, which
is a rare event in the aircraft operation.
The members of the government committee investigating the circumstance of the emergency
landing showed that the emergency system was efficient but the aircraft crew did not use it
because one of the key fuses, which secured several aircraft’s systems, including the emer-
gency landing gear extension system, was disabled. If the fuse had been enabled, the dramatic
landing at the Warsaw’s Okęcie would not have happened.
9.4. Rescue process of the critical situation
In the considered flight, an event involving consideration of the activating element as usable,
regardless of its state, occurred, and it was not subject to diagnosing [2]. The unaware classifi-
cation of the unfit device as usable without diagnosing is a systemic error of the second type.
Figure 7. The course of αm function for C αð Þ various values for α ¼ 0, 1.
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In the model representing the situation of the emergency landing on November 1, 2011, it is
possible to distinguish the following elements (Figure 8): protected object—landing gear extension
system, protecting object—emergency landing gear extension system and the activating element.
In Figure 8, the probabilistic characteristics of the implementation time of the security task and
available time were marked.
TOB—random variable of the security task implementation time,
FOB tð Þ—distribution function of the random variable of the security task implementation time,
tOB,—random variable implementation: time of the flight over the airport and search for the
solution,
TD—random variable of available time: time of the flight limited by fuel residues,
FD tð Þ—distribution function of the random variable of available time,
tD—implementation of the random variable of available time: maximum time of the flight
limited by fuel residues.
The available time determines the reasonable time necessary to prevent a dangerous situation.
In general, this time may be determined by, for example, a fuel resource, a resource of an active
substance or any other type of energy extending the system operation.
The analysis of the situation and taking activities at available time can be described as follows:
• receiving information about the hydraulic system leak;
• making the decision to continue the flight;
• initiation of the landing procedure;
• receiving information about a faulty protection system (electrical system);
• analysis of the obtained information and search for a solution;
• making the decision about the emergency landing on the aircraft fabric covering;
• implementation of the made decision;
• inspection of the made decision.
Figure 8. Relief system model with the protection system.
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After receiving the information about a defective protection system (electrical system) and
inability to release the landing gear, there was the search for solutions, which had to take place
at the available time—TD. After recognition of the erroneous evaluation of the emergency sys-
tem, the only solution left was the use of a different emergency protection system in the form of
the fuselage designed for this purpose. Owing to the pilot’s wise action, great skills and precise
operation, the implementation of the made decision on the emergency landing was successful.
This type of situation can be described with the salvage equation, which designates the proba-
bility of the danger defuse at the available time through the convolution of distribution functions
of random variables of the available time and implementation time of the rescue task.
P TOB < TDð Þ ¼
ð∞
0
FD tþ τð ÞdFOB tð Þ (134)
The probability distribution of the available time depends on the type of event. For example,
for a survivor at sea, it will be the time of survival dependent on circumstances (temperature of
the water and his or her own equipment); for the aircraft, the remained flight persistence; for a
parachutist, remaining height, etc. The probability distribution of the implementation time of
an intervention task also depends on many factors—the type of the task, the degree of the
rescue team or system’s readiness, action efficiency.
In the cited example, making the right decision and the precise landing proved to be the right
action preventing from crash. The implementation of random variables in the considered event
in the relationship, (tOB < tD) fulfilled the salvage condition.
The presented analysis of the diagnosis errors and the rescue process model were presented in
a shortened version due to the limited scope of the chapter.
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